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Abstract This paper introduces the objectives and basic approach of a collaborative
comparative research project on the introduction of national electronic Identity
Management Systems (eIDMS) in Member States of the European Union. Altogether
eight country case studies have been produced in two waves by researchers in the
respective countries, which will be presented in the following articles in this special
issue. The studies adopt a common conceptual framework and use the same
terminology, which will be presented in this introduction, just as the reasoning for the
selection of the particular countries under investigation. The conceptual framework
combines elements of actor centred institutionalism with path analysis, looking for path
continuation, change or creation in the transition from the previous IDMS to an
electronic one and explaining this as choices of actors in certain contexts. Information
on the reasons for these choices in the first four cases has been collected from in depth
interviews with key actors and in the four other cases from official documents. As the
subject of this research is the transition of national identity management systems only
countries have been included in which a national ID and a civil registry already exist
before the introduction of the electronic elements, thus excluding the UK.
Keywords Comparative research . Diffusion of innovations . eCommerce .
eGovernment . electronic Identity Management Systems (eIDMS) . ID Cards .
Institutionalism . Path dependency . Privacy and security . Social shaping of technology
Electronic identities as a multi-facet innovation
Since the Internet and in particular e-mail and the World Wide Web have been
adopted as means of information and communication in business, government and
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leisure time, there has been a discussion about electronic, digital or cyber identity. In
fact there are several debates, partly overlapping, but also quite distinct, covering
different areas of action and starting from different values and norms (cf. Hornung
2005; Bennett and Lyon 2008; Halperin and Backhouse 2008; Rannenberg et al.
2009). One prominent discourse was and still is about cyber identity. While in real
life people are assumed to have one single identity, but may stay anonymous in
many everyday transactions, for e-mail or in online discussion for a they have to take
an identity, but remain free to choose different identities in different contexts without
being considered schizophrenic or committing fraud. Instead, the possibilities of
taking different identities also called partial identities, is appreciated as a new
dimension of individual freedom and as a means to avoid the matching of personal
data recorded in different contexts.
Different requirements in different contexts
What works well in one area of the virtual world causes problems and concerns in
others. As applications for electronic business and government services emerged and
legally binding transactions began to be offered, the free choice and change of digital
or electronic identities became unacceptable in many cases. While in eCommerce
vendors most of all want to be sure that they get paid for their delivery of goods and
services and may not care whether the user name provided is the officially registered
name, the buyer wants to know the legal identity of the vendor to claim his rights if
the vendor does not deliver or if there are other complaints. With regard to public
online services in most cases there is the legal requirement to identify oneself with
the registered name in order to qualify for benefits or services.
Different levels of security
There are different methods and technologies for identifying users in online
transactions with different degrees of security. In all Member States of the European
Union online access is protected by username and password or PIN code for almost
all eGovernment and eCommerce services. All experts agree that this is a rather
weak level of protection not only because passwords can be hacked but also because
of successful cases of identity theft, in particular phishing (see OECD 2009).
Security levels are distinguished according to the number of factors employed for
authentication. One-factor-methods require either something one knows (e.g.
password) or something one has (e.g. a token such as a chip card). Two-factor-
methods, also called “strong authentication”, require the combination of elements of
both kinds (possession and knowledge) (e.g. OECD 2006). Apart from the number
of factors, the reliability of the registration process is another important parameter.
Attributes which are connected to an officially registered and confirmed identity
provide for a higher level of security than individually defined identities.
For online banking, where the motivation for identity theft is highest, so far there are
only a few solutions for strong authentication procedures, such as one-time-password
generators. However, concerns regarding the security and financial risks of online
transactions create a significant barrier for citizens/consumers to using online services.
Accordingly more secure, “stronger” methods of authentication are considered to raise
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trust and confidence and thereby to overcome these barriers.1 Officially certified and
secure electronic identities may serve this purpose. A PIN-protected smartcard, based
on the officially registered identity, would meet these requirements and might increase
trust in the security of online transactions in eGovernment and eCommerce.
Conflicts between security and privacy requirements
In the late 1990s this kind of considerations in many countries has led governments
to consider introducing national electronic Identity Management Systems (eIDMS),
in many cases based on the officially registered national identity of their citizens.
However, if the electronic identity (eID) required for online authentication is the
officially registered identity and if several different eGovernment services are
accessed by the same eID, the personal data related to this identity in different
sectors could be merged and profiles could be generated, something which was not
possible before or at least only with extraordinary efforts. This would not be in line
with existing privacy legislation, which in the EU Member States requires that only
data necessary for a particular service can be collected and that these data may only
be used for this specific purpose, but not for any other. Therefore eIDs raise issues of
privacy and must be regulated in accordance with privacy legislation.
So there is the paradox situation that eID can contribute to security and at the same
time may become a threat to privacy (see also Halperin and Backhouse 2008). Taylor et
al. (2009), in addition, point to a third aspect, which may play a role in citizens´ or users´
choice to accept stronger methods of authentication: the improvement of public services
and convenience. A single chip card for authentication in different online services
relieves from remembering and searching the right password and failing in log-ins.
The conflict between security and privacy requirements is not insurmountable. It
is not a zero-sum game (Halperin and Backhouse 2008). Rather there are technical
and organisational means to preserve privacy in eIDMS. Several research projects
are devoted to privacy enhancing identity management.2 However, most of this
research deals with individual identity management (“How do I manage my different
identities including pseudonyms?”) or with identity management within
organisations (“How do organisations define and administer the different partial
identities of their members, including user-centric provisions?”). There is not much
discretion for similar features with regard to official identities of citizens on the
national level. In particular pseudonyms are not an option for officially registered
identities in this context, even though partial identities may be.
A few countries have taken measures to preserve privacy within their national eIDMS.
This may be due to the extent to which this conflict is perceived by the respective national
legislator and the general public. Although the EU privacy directive has been adopted by
all Member States and been transposed into national law, there are big differences, e.g.
1 For example 69% of bank customers in an international online survey would like to see their bank
offering stronger authentication methods than username and PIN. See https://www.info-point-security.
com/security-themen/identity/952-rsaemc-ergebnisse-der-jaehrlichen-qfraudq-studie-veroeffentlicht-.html?
date=2009-02-01
2 In particular the PRIME Project (Privacy and Identity Management in Europe) https://www.prime-
project.eu/ e.g. Hansen et al (2004) and the recommendations of the FIFDIS project http://www.fidis.net,
in particular the recommendations by Cameron et al. (2009)
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regarding the above mentioned principle of purpose bounded collection and processing
of personal data. According to Article 6 of the Privacy Directive, Member States shall
provide that personal data have to be “collected for specific, explicit and legitimate
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.” 3
While Austria has developed a complex system of sector specific partial eIDs to adhere
to this principle in eGovernment, Belgium with its eGovernment legislation has
introduced the principle of the single authentic data source, also called the Ask-Only-
Once-Principle. Citizens may only be asked once for specific data, which have to be
stored and kept by one responsible agency; no other agency is allowed to collect the
same data again, but has to access the single authentic source, if it is entitled by law.4 In
those countries, which have a unique personal identity number for each citizen there
was almost no concern about merging data from different areas of public administration
when introducing electronic identities. By contrast, countries like the United Kingdom
which have no obligation for citizens to register and to keep an identifying document,
have seen strong political protests, when trying to introduce such an obligation just to
improve security and legal commitment in online transactions (cf. the chapters in Part 3
of Bennett and Lyon 2008 as well as Backhouse and Halperin 2009).
Links to public safety issues
There is another aspect which adds to the complexity of the issue: The debate about
electronic identity in eGovernment and eCommerce as well as their linking to officially
registered identities took place at a time when there was also a debate about improving
the security of existing ID documents, in particular after September 11, 2001, in order to
fight terrorism and/or illegal immigration. Electronic identity cards with a chip and
biometric data were introduced in a few Member States of the European Union for the
purpose of stronger visual and/or physical authentication at national borders and for
inspection by the police. Some data on the same chip may be used for authentication in
online transactions as well. Although the biometric data on an eID card may and cannot
be used for authentication in online services, the fact that they are stored on the same
smartcard links the online security debate with a public safety debate and thereby with
the privacy concerns about the collection of biometric data and other intrusions into
privacy. Once again there are big differences among the EU Member States: While
Germany, Portugal and Spain include biometric data on their new eID cards, Austria and
Belgium refused to do so and explicitly separate the online security measures from the
public safety issues.
Objectives of a comparative research project
Considering the efforts of the European Union to provide for improved mobility for
its citizens through interoperability of national eIDMS5, these differences have to be
3 Directive 95/46/EC (Directive on protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data) http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/index_en.htm
4 For details see the Belgian case study by Mariën and Van Audenhove (2010).
5 In particular through the STORK project (Secure Identity Across Borders Linked). See http://www.eid-stork.eu
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addressed and therefore have to be assessed, analysed and understood. This calls for
comparative analysis and scientifically valid explanations.
Furthermore there is another important research question: besides the more specific
discussion about privacy, security and convenience outlined so far, in the academic
world there is a more general, fundamental, and partly philosophical debate about the
nature of human identity and about changes of identities in the so-called information
society (see Rannenberg et al. 2009 as well as the previous issues of this Journal).
Some authors argue that the Internet ("cyberspace") and the identities people assume
there have become more relevant than the officially registered ones. Others argue that
online authentication with one official identity which is also registered when crossing
a national border provides for a new level of surveillance and therefore fundamentally
changes the relation between the citizen and the state (e.g. Bennett and Lyon 2008).
There are many unproven assumptions and premature generalizations in this debate,
which should be subject to empirical inspection as well.
When in 2005 in Germany the replacement of the machine-readable paper-based
identity card by an electronic chip card with biometric features was decided and an
additional electronic identity function for online transactions was proposed, the idea
arose for a comparative research project. This project should help to understand the
differences between the national eIDMS in other European countries and assess the
scope and magnitude of changes in the citizen-government relation. In addition, as a
practical side effect and benefit, the project should take the chance to learn from
those countries, which already had started introducing their national eIDMS. The
independent Volkswagen Foundation6 provided a grant for this research in its
research programme on Innovation Processes in Economy and Society.
Defining the object of research and basic definitions
The term eID is used in different contexts with different meanings. There is not only
the difference between personal, organisational and national eIDMS, but also the
different parts and functions of such a system have also to be addressed; so there is a
need to define the different elements which constitute an eIDMS.
For a clarification of the basic terms, we adopt the definitions of a Study on
Identity Management in eGovernment launched by the European Commission,
which has proposed a "Common Terminological Framework for Interoperable
Electronic Identity Management" (Modinis Study 2005).7 It starts from the concept
of an entity, which may be a person, a company or even a computer: "An entity is
anyone (natural or legal person) or anything that shall be characterized through the
measurement of attributes."8
6 See http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/index.html?L=1
7 Modinis is a programme by the European Commission providing financial support for the
implementation of the eEurope 2005 Action Plan with the objectives of monitoring and comparing
performance, dissemination of good practices and improvement of network and information security. (http://ec.
europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/modinis/index_en.htm). Among the studies funded
within this programme is one on identity management in eGovernment, lead by the University of Leuven.
8 See also Appendix D2 in Rannenberg et al. (2009, pp. 501) and the similar definitions by the OECD
(2006, p. 21).
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& The identity of an entity is defined as "the dynamic collection of all of the
entity’s attributes”.
& An entity has only one identity, but it may have several digital identities.
& “A digital identity is a partial identity in an electronic form.” It is a subset of
attributes.
& “An attribute is a distinct, measurable, physical or abstract named property
belonging to an entity.”
& Certain attributes serve as identifiers:
& “An identifier is an attribute or set of attributes of an entity which uniquely
identifies the entity within a certain context.” (Modinis Study 2005)
We will use “electronic” identity (eID) synonymously with “digital” identity as
defined here.
Focus on online authentication
Some of the benefits and concerns mentioned above only occur in certain contexts
and not in others. Therefore it is important to define those functions and their
contexts, which are subject of the research presented here. From the definitions
above it is not necessarily clear what the adjective “electronic” refers to. Is an
“electronic identity” an identity, which is represented by electronic means and/or
readable by electronic devices, i.e. a number or letters stored on an electronic chip or
printed in a machine-readable code on a piece of paper? Or does the adjective refer
to a field of application, i.e. electronic services? In other words, is “electronic" an
attribute of a token or of the data stored for identifying persons, or both? Depending
on which interpretation we choose, we enter quite different contexts (Fig. 1).
If we look at identity data in electronic systems, they are entered from paper-
based forms or by electronic exchange between back-office systems and only to a
small extent via transmission from an electronic identity card (left box in Fig. 1). In
Fig. 1 Two meanings and contexts of eID
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this context, the eID card only changes one entry channel among others, while the
crucial question concerns the kind of data used for identifying citizens in different
administrative systems and the regulation of the exchange of such data. Introducing
an eID card does not necessarily change the back office identification and data
exchange procedures, but raises corresponding concerns.
If we start from an eID card as a new electronic token which substitutes previous
paper-based ID cards (right box in Fig. 1), we also have to take into account visual
inspection of persons and checks on the authenticity of the card itself. In this context,
the inclusion of biometric attributes (face image, fingerprints) on the eID card
becomes an issue with contested consequences, while so far biometrics have not yet
become relevant for authentication in online services.
For the research presented here, we are only looking at the overlap between
the two views, i.e. the introduction of an electronic identity on an electronic
token for electronic authentication designed for the online usage of electronic
services (Fig. 2).
Terminology
Identification has been defined as “the process of using claimed or observed
attributes of an entity to deduce who the entity is." Identification has to be
distinguished from authentication and both from authorization as well as registration
(cf. Modinis Study 2005, p. 10).
& "Authentication is the corroboration of a claimed set of attributes or facts with a
specified or understood level of confidence". Authentication may refer to data or
to an entity. "Entity authentication is the corroboration of the claimed identity of
an entity and a set of its observed attributes" (ibid. p.7).
& "Authorization refers to (1) the permission of an authenticated entity to perform a
defined action or to use a defined service/resource, (2) the process of determining
by evaluation of applicable permissions whether an authenticated entity is
allowed to have access to a particular resource" (ibid. p.8).
Fig. 2 Focus of this research
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& “A token is any hardware or software that contains credentials related to
attributes. Tokens may take any form, ranging from a digital data set to smart
cards or mobile phones. Tokens can be used for both data/entity authentication
(authentication tokens) and authorisation purposes (authorisation tokens)” (ibid.
p.15).
& “Registration of an entity is the process in which the entity is identified and/or
other attributes are corroborated. As a result of the registration, a partial identity
is assigned to the entity for a certain context. In other words, the registration of
an entity is the process of linking a (partial) identity to the identity of the entity
by corroborating a specific set of attributes, which do not necessarily need to
include identifiers. Successful completion of the registration procedures results in
the granting of a means (e.g. a credential) by which the entity can be
authenticated in the future” (ibid. pp 14 f.)
& “A context is a sphere of activity, a geographic region, a communication
platform, an application, a logical or physical domain”, e.g. a sector of
government or a certain governmental service (ibid. pp. 8f).
& “A credential is a piece of information attesting to the integrity of certain stated
facts. Credentials are primarily used in the process of entity authentication, and
are often incorporated in an authentication token, e.g. a smart card, bank card,
mobile phone, etc.” But they do not necessarily have to be integrated into a
token, as in the case of passwords. Certificates are a common type of credential
in a PKI system (ibid. p.9).
& “Corroboration is the confirmation by provision of sufficient evidence and
examination thereof that specific requirements have been fulfilled. The term
“verfication” is often used as synonym of corroboration” (ibid. p. 9). The OECD
terminology uses the term “assurance” for processes by which a relying party
may check the validity of the authentication via certificates or other means
“Assurance is not absolute: it is a defined level of confidence….” (OECD 2006,
p. 21).
Legally binding transactions, e.g. applications, claims or contracts, often require a
hand written signature on a form. There are cryptographic technologies providing for
a digital equivalent to handwritten signatures within eGovernment and eCommerce.
In the most advanced form they are generated and administered in an institutional
environment that is called Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with certification
authorities (CA), issuing certificates, which confirm the assignment of a particular
key to a registered person. Germany was among the first countries to pass legislation
for electronic signatures, adopting a market-oriented approach, which allows for
several CAs under state licence. Other countries established only one state owned
CA. Furthermore, there are different technologies with different security levels. In
1999 a European Directive on Electronic Signatures aimed at a certain degree of
harmonisation (Directive 1999/93/EC). In particular the directive distinguishes three
kinds of signatures:
& A simple form of e-signature is simply called "electronic signature" and is
defined as "data in electronic form which are attached to or logically associated
with other electronic data, which serve as a method of authentication". This may
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be a name written under the text in an e-mail. It only allows the authentication of
a claimed identity of an entity, but not the corroboration of this identity.
& In contrast, an "advanced electronic signature" uniquely identifies and
authenticates the signer of a message, and will allow checking the integrity of
the signed data. Asymmetric cryptographic technologies, such as PKI and digital
certificates, are mostly used for advanced electronic signatures. They are issued
by a Trusted Third Party and may take the form of a piece of software to be
stored on the hard disk of a PC or on a hardware token such as a smart card.
& A higher level of trustworthiness is provided by advanced electronic signatures
which are based on a qualified certificate and which are created by a “secure
signature-creation device” (SSCD). According to the directive and most of the
national laws only these "qualified electronic signatures" are to be recognised
with the same legal status and consequences as a handwritten signature.
Technically an SSCD must be a smartcard or similar hardware device, and an
acknowledged authority must confirm the content of the certificate.
A certificate is defined as “an electronic attestation, which links signature
verification data to a person and confirms the identity of that person”. According to
the Directive 1999/93/EC, a qualified certificate must contain, among other things,
the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, the identification of the CA, the state in
which it is established and several attributes pertaining to the allowed use of the
certificate. However, Member States are free to include additional data. Countries,
which have a unique national Personal Identity Number frequently include this in
the certificates. In these cases an electronic signature may also be used for
authentication purposes. But most frequently eID cards contain two certificates, one
for authentication and another one for the e-signature, which may come from
different certification authorities.
EID management systems: components and architecture
The subject of this research has been termed eID management system. The Modinis
terminology defines:
“Identity management is the managing of partial identities of entities, i.e.,
definition, designation and administration of identity attributes as well as
choice of the partial identity to be (re-) used in a specific context.“
“An identity management system is the organisational and technical infra-
structure used for the definition, designation and administration of identity
attributes” (Modinis Study 2005, pp. 11 f.).
These definitions cover personal, organisational and national eIDMS. From the
description of the functions of an eID card in a national eIDMS it becomes obvious
that on this level there is a need for
– an infrastructure for production, distribution, personalization of tokens, e.g. chip
based eID cards,
– an infrastructure for the production and distribution of certificates and the
accreditation of CAs,
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– an infrastructure for administering identity attributes (e.g. civil registers) and
– provisions for distributing the technical components on the user side including
support via hotlines etc.
These four subsystems together build the supply side of an even larger system,
which includes the providers of online services as well.
Figure 3 depicts the technical components on the side of the citizen, including a
PC or in some cases a mobile phone, an eID card, a card reader, a client software and
web browser software. This system interacts with systems on the side of a provider
of an eGovernment or eCommerce service, which consists of an eID server with
appropriate middleware, which performs the authentication before the user gets
access to the service he requests. In Germany, the provider of the eGovernment or
eCommerce server needs an access certificate, which allows access by the eID server
only to a predefined selection of the attribute data on the eID card.
The eID card (or other token) has to be requested at an issuing agency and may
be personalised by another agency, which receives the card from a producer and the
data representing the identity from a register keeping agency. When technical
problems arise in the course of the installation of the components on both sides,
there is usually a support hotline. If the eID card can also include an electronic
signature, this possibly has to be requested from another certification authority. In
some cases, additional components and institutions may be involved.
In this definition of an eIDMS, we do not include the infrastructure employed for
visual authentication at national borders and by police officers with special card
readers and reference systems for authentication. Rather we conceive this public
safety system with its own infrastructure as a separate but related system because
investigating and comparing the processes behind the card check at the border would
call for a completely different research project.
Fig. 3 Elements of an eIDMS
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According to the terminology introduced here, the subject area of this comparative
study on national eIDMS includes the processes of identification, registration,
authentication and authorization of citizens for using public online services of
government or business via tokens with national validity and some kind of state
authorization, considering the technical, organisational and regulatory aspects.
Available research and research approaches
When the idea for a comparative European research project on national eIDMS
emerged, information about the status in the Member States was provided by two
reports published by the European Commission: the Modinis Study on Interoperability
of eID Modinis Study (2006)9 and another one by IDABC (IDABC 2007).10
However, they contain only a compilation of comparable descriptions of the existing
and planned systems in each Member State and focus on technical features and legal
provisions. Thus they provided a good starting point but not any explanations.
Search for an appropriate conceptual framework
Checking the broader eGovernment literature did not lead to any theory driven
comparisons of other nation wide innovations such as electronic signatures, the
implementation of the EU-privacy directive, or authentication in online banking or
e-payment etc. As the synoptical compilations in most cases came from only one
expert only in each country, they are highly selective and do not cover all the aspects
that may be relevant for explaining the differences from other Member States.
Therefore in order to explain differences in the eIDMS, it would not be sufficient to
do a secondary analysis of existing documents. Adopting an actor-oriented
approach, key actors had to be identified, and the decision and implementation
processes had to be analysed using data from interviews with these actors. To
develop a specific conceptual framework for this analysis and for an appropriate
interview guide, different social science theoretical approaches had to be taken into
consideration. In particular concepts of innovation research, research on the Social
Shaping of Technology (SST) and Large Technical Systems (LTS) as well as Policy
Field Analysis were considered. There is no space to review these different
approaches in detail here, but the basic conclusions may be summarized as follows:
& The introduction of an eIDMS can be conceived as an innovation, and different
approaches by Member States might be characterized as either more radical or more
incremental innovations. However, it was felt that the concepts and assumptions of
innovation research did not adequately cover this particular kind of innovation.
Recent innovation research assumes that innovations emerge from networks of
9 The Status of Identity Management in European eGovernment Initiatives. Modinis Study on Identity
Management in eGovernment, Deliverable D 3.5, June 2006, https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-
idm/twiki/bin/view.cgi.
10 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/6484/5644. IDABC is a programme by the Euzropean Commis-
sion. The acronym stands for Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services to public
Administrations, Business and Citizens.
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actors, with no clear distinction between traditional phases, e.g. invention,
production and diffusion (cf. Rammert 1997, 2007, Sauer and Lang 1999), while
in the case of eIDMS there still is one dominating actor, who has to anticipate many
details of his planned system and to define these in legislation in advance.
& eIDMS also can be considered as Large Technical Systems (Hughes 1987,
Mayntz and Hughes 1988, Jörges 1988). However the basic assumption there is
that around a particular technical invention, e.g. electricity or railways, a large
technical and organisational system with infrastructural character emerges. An
eIDMS including the production of cards, used for online-authentication and
national border control without any doubt has infrastructural character; however, it is
not emerging around a new technology, but only changing an already existing
institutional system; furthermore this change does not initiate new technologies, but
combines different existing technologies to a new, complex socio-technical system.
According to Braun and Jörges (1994) this can be called a Second Order LTS.
& More appropriate seemed a conceptual framework by Mayntz and Schneider,
which has been developed on the LTS background and applied in a comparative
analysis of the introduction of videotex systems in three European countries
(Mayntz 1988, Mayntz and Schneider 1988, Schneider 1989). In line with the
assumptions of the Social Shaping of Technology research they assume that these
complex socio-technical systems are the outcome of an interaction system in which
institutional actors as stakeholders in one or several arenas make choices between
different technical options. The available options provided by a technical pool, and
organisational and regulatory provisions are negotiated under the influence of
context factors such as the legal environment, cultural norms etc. (Fig. 4).
As a political scientist Mayntz has later on generalized the institutional actor
approach together with Scharpf as an approach for policy analysis in other fields as
well. This approach is called “institutionalism” in political science and is well
established in comparative analysis and policy field analysis (Scharpf 2000).
Fig. 4 Determinants of the development of technical systems (Mayntz/Schneider 1988)
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According to Scharpf, policy field analysis can either be problem oriented or
interaction oriented. The former tries to analyse the emergence of a societal problem
and the effectiveness of the policy chosen to deal with this problem. The latter
instead examines the interaction between policy makers and the conditions that
favour or impede their ability to adopt and implement their policy responses. The
study of institutions on the one hand is focussing on the genesis and transformation
of institutional arrangements, and on the other hand on the consequences that
institutions may pose for actors and actions. By combining these two twofold views,
four cells emerge (Table 1).
The combination of a problem oriented policy research with a focus on emerging
institutions explains how new institutions arise as a result of policies which are
supposed to solve new societal problems. The second cell combines problem
oriented policy research with the analysis of the consequences of existing institutions
and asks how the existence of given institutions contributes to the emergence or
avoidance of certain societal problems. The third cell combines interaction oriented
policy research with the focus on the genesis of institutions and tries to explain
institutional change as the outcome of strategic interactions between purposeful and
resourceful actors. Finally the fourth cell deals with institutions as one set of factors
influencing the interactions between policy makers and the capacity of a policy-
making system to adopt effective responses to policy problems.
We do not consider the four perspectives as mutually exclusive, but as different
views, which may be combined very well within one research design. Obviously
eIDMS can be conceived as institutions, which are to solve new problems and
emerge as the result of strategic interactions between purposeful and resourceful
actors. But these interactions take place in already existing institutions, and
therefore the view of cell # 4 has to be applied as well.
Scharpf (2000) points to a few factors complicating both approaches, which have
to be considered when developing a research design:
& The question of effective policy responses, hindered or supported by existing
institutions, cannot be answered without reference to and knowledge of the policy
problem and the different options for solving this problem. This knowledge lies
outside political science, but in our case we can draw on this knowledge from
computer science regarding the technical aspects of an eIDMS.
& Policy problems are not given but construed, they do not always correspond to
policy legacies, i.e. existing structures and procedures for dealing with certain
classes of problems. e-Identity and eGovernment are not established policy
Table 1 Research approaches in comparative policy analysis as distinguished by Scharpf (2000)
Institutional perspective Genetic Consequential
Policy perspective
Problem oriented Institutions emerge as reaction
to policy problems
Institutions influence the policy
adopted
Interaction oriented Institutions emerge as the result of
the interaction of policy makers
Institutions influence the interaction
of policy makers
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fields, and the assignment of the eIDMS development to respective problems and
to institutional subsystems may vary. Therefore this assignment to a policy field
is a variable and nor a precondition in our studies.
& Institutional conditions do not determine the actions of persons representing
these institutions. They enable and restrict their actions and there is still
discretion for individual actors ´ preferences and orientations. This calls for
taking into account the context influence of cultural norms in the Mayntz/
Schneider framework and as far as governments as institutions are considered,
the affiliation of actors to political parties and their ideologies.
A link between the different institutional perspectives in Table 1 can be
established by more recent concepts of path dependency. The concept of path
dependency was originally developed by economists to explain technology adoption
processes as well as the evolution of economic development. The theory was
empirically substantiated by David’s studies of the sustainability of a well-
established technical standard: the QWERTY keyboard (David 1985). The key
aspect emphasised in theory and evaluated in empirical studies, is the missing
determinant for economic processes. Progress cannot be identified as moving
continuously toward some pre-determined equilibrium but is pushed by non-linear
processes (see e.g. Dosi 1982). Therefore existing systems show a high degree of
persistence and any change meets resistances and needs additional resources as well
as particular driving forces. In retroperspect this leads to the conclusion that "history
matters", which may sound trivial. Meanwhile, a more differentiated discussion
within and about path dependency theories has taken place, which states that there
may be different reasons and options for path continuation and that there are cases of
path continuation as well as cases of path modification or break-up (Meyer and
Schubert 2007; Deutschmann 2007). While path analysis in most cases does not
consider actors, Garud and Karnoe (2001) have highlighted the role of actors
embedded in the structure of an established path. Accordingly one can investigate if,
why and to what extent these actors maintain or modify this path or purposefully
break up and create a new path. Figure 5 illustrates this broader view on path
creation, path persistence and break-up.
Fig. 5 Phases and forms of path development (from Meyer and Schubert 2007, p. 12)
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A more differentiated analysis of technological innovations might distinguish
between different kinds of paths. The traditional focus of path analysis is on
technological paths, but in the light of our institutional approach the technical
components are embedded in organisational arrangements and subject to legal
regulations, whose relation to technological changes may be continued, adapted or
be replaced by completely new ones, i.e. there is a choice of path continuation,
change or creation both for an organisational and a regulatory path.
A combination of the institutional approach with path analysis allows for a more
powerful synthesis. Path analysis is enhanced by focussing on actors´ choices
between path continuation, change or path creation, and the institutional approach
can combine the generic and the consequential perspective by referring to these path
related changes. Choices are made by actors on behalf of the existing institutions,
they represent, but these choices do concern the future of these institutions as well as
continuing, changing or creating other institutions as parts of the eIDMS.
To be more precise: We assume that there is a number of policy makers
(institutional actors) in government and parliament, who interact in order to develop
an eIDMS as a policy response to the societal problem of security concerns related
to the Internet. They represent existing institutions and interact under existing
regulation. But some of them have the power to change existing organisations and
regulation, to create new organisations as part of a new socio-technical system, i.e.
they do not only choose between technological options but also between
continuation, change or creation on the organisational and regulatory path.
This integration of the institutional perspectives and path analysis leads to a
revised conceptual framework, which is depicted in Fig. 6 and is composed of five
main categories of variables:
(1) the interaction system including the main institutional actors and the process of
interaction,
(2) the new socio-technical system eIDMS as outcome of the interaction process,
consisting of technical, organisational and regulatory components,
(3) the relation of the new eIDMS to the previous one in respect of technological,
organisational and regulatory path continuity or change,
(4) context factors under which the actors negotiate and make their path related
choices,
(5) the diffusion of the eIDMS, i.e. the adoption of the ID function by service
providers in eGovernment and eCommerce, the number of tokens issued and
the frequency of use of the eID function.
The context factors highlighted in the Mayntz/Schneider framework, e.g. legal
structure, market structure, culture, political structure (Fig. 4), are assumed to have
already influenced this existing system. In Fig. 6 accordingly on the left side there
are arrows marking an influence of the technological pool out of which a
technological path for the old system, had been created, a regulatory path for the
old pattern of regulation coming out of the legal structure, and an organisational
path emerging from the existing structure of public administration establishing the
institutions to administer the eIDs.
In order to explain the actors´ choice to continue with, modify or break from these
existing paths we assume that in particular “culture and values” as well as the “political
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power distribution” are most relevant. From the first interviews we learned that at least in
some cases events such as September 11 changed the priority of values and led to
changes of the relationship between privacy and security culture. We also learned that
changes of government after elections changed the actor constellation and thereby the
priorities in the development process, which caused delays or initiated speedups.
Therefore arrows are drawn in Fig. 6 for these two context factors directly pointing to the
interaction system, and separate arrows mark the influence of certain events.
Although the focus of this study is on the development process and the eIDMS as
its output, an attempt has been made to assess the acceptance and usage of the
system by providers of online services and their users as well. For a comprehensive
analysis of the diffusion, acceptance and usage of an eIDMS, different research
methods and interviews with others actors and surveys on citizens´ attitudes and
behaviour would have been necessary. This was outside the scope of this project, but
some statistical data was collected to allow for a few conclusions regarding the
effectiveness of the choices taken and the contribution the innovation has made to
solve the problem it was developed for.
To explain higher or lower rates of usage of the eID function by citizens we
employ Rogers´ theory of the diffusion of innovations. Rogers (2003) puts particular
emphasis on the way in which an innovation is communicated. He proposes that the
rate of adoption is higher for innovations which
& offer a clear relative advantage,
& are compatible with past experiences and with the needs of potential adopters,
Fig. 6 Context-dependent path-choices in the transition of a national IDMS to an eIDMS
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& are not too complex and do not afford new skills and
& are triable and observable.
In a study for the European Commission on barriers to the diffusion of electronic
signatures the German Fraunhofer Institute has applied Rogers´ theory and
concludes that electronic signatures are associated with high costs, are hard to
understand and hard to get started, and that there is a lack of support (Fraunhofer
Institute FOKUS 2006). It may well be that the eID based authentication meets the
same barriers to diffusion.
Aspirations and design of the empirical research
The conceptual framework depicted in Fig. 6 does not provide detailed
hypotheses about the kind of relation between the factors mentioned or the
different values that the variables mentioned might take. Given the little available
knowledge on the factors that influence this kind of decision it did not seem
appropriate to formulate detailed hypotheses in advance and test them in a
comparative research design. Instead we aimed at exploring possible influences
along the categories defined in the conceptual framework and to arrive at some
generalisations about influences that provide for a plausible explanation of
differences between the national eIDMS. This may be called grounded theory
(Glaser and Strauss 1967).
As the interviews in the countries under study were to be conducted by
researchers in the respective countries an interview guide has been developed
containing more than fifty questions relating to the different categories and elements
of the framework, in order to attain at a high degree of comparability. In addition
categories of possible relevant actors have been distinguished, based on the
descriptive reports available. At the beginning of this cooperative research a
workshop was held to reach a common understanding of the framework and the
questions and to define the 10 to 15 most important actors in each country to be
interviewed. From the available documents we were able to identify the ministries
involved in the process. In addition, representatives from organizations administer-
ing the former/present IDMS, e.g. civil registry, and government organizations
offering online services, in most cases tax authorities, were identified as well as
representatives from the private sector, in particular IT industry and eCommerce and
banks. Fortunately almost all actors approached agreed to be interviewed. In order to
assess whether the interview guide fits to the different situations the author of this
paper and coordinator of the whole project participated in two or three interviews in
each of the four countries under investigation. After the first three to five interviews
in each country a second workshop was held in order to review the interview guide
and to enhance the conceptual framework.
Selection of countries
The extent to which generalizations prove to be valid crucially depends on the
selection of the cases from which they are derived. As resources did not allow
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for a full analysis of all EU Member States introducing an eIDMS, we
developed a two-stage research design. In a first stage four in depth case
studies have been conducted with between 10 to 15 expert interviews in each
country. The findings of these cases have been compared and a number of
generalizations have been derived. In a second phase experts in four other
countries have been asked to summarize the development of the eIDMS in their
respective country and to reflect on what extent these generalizations apply to
their case as well.
In comparative political analysis there is an intensive debate about
appropriate selection methods, mostly discussing the two ideal type approaches
of the “most similar” and the “most different” design (Jahn 2006, pp. 223ff.). But
first of all the basic population has to be defined. The units of analysis are
national eIDMS of Member States of the European Union. As the study
should provide empirical evidence on the introduction of eIDMS, conceived
as the process of transition from an existing IDMS to a new electronic
IDMS, and not deal with public debates about planned eIDMS, only those
countries belong to the basic population which in 2007 had an established
national IDMS and which had started introducing a new eIDMS. Based on
Fig. 7 EU Member States with eID cards in 2007 (vorhanden=existing)
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For budget reasons, it was not possible to conduct intensive case studies in all
seven countries. For actors interviews besides Germany only three could be selected.
In order to draw lessons for the still planned eIDMS in Germany a “most similar
design” seemed most appropriate. Most relevant seemed a similarity with regard to
basic characteristics of the existing legal national IDMS, e.g. the obligation of
citizens to register and to hold an ID card as well as basic features of the eIDMS. As
the planned German eID was to use the national eID card as token and would
include digital fingerprints on the card as well as particular technical privacy
provisions, these variables were used as reference points to assess the similarity.
Table 2 presents the data, which have been collected from the IDABC country
profiles (IDABC 2007). No country profile completely matched with the German
profile, but Austria and Spain are similar with regard to four respectively three
variables. Among the other countries with only two matching variables Belgium was
chosen because of its more advanced rollout.
For scientific purposes, such a German centered selection may be not be
satisfactory. In order to check to what extend this selection distorts the findings and
hinders generalisations at the European level, a second set of case studies has been
Table 2 eIDMS country profiles (based on IDABC 2007)
Point of
reference
Countries with eID rollout in 2007
Germany Spain Austria Belgium Estonia Finland Italy Portugal
Obligation to
register
Yes Similar Similar Similar Similar Similar Similar Similar
Obligation to
have ID card
optionala Different Similar Different Different Different Different Different
eID card = ID card Yes Similar Different Similar Similar Similar Different Similar
Unique Personal
Identity Number
No Different Similar Different Different Different Different Different
Biometrics on
eID card
Yes Similar Different Different Different Different Different Different
Technical privacy
provisions
Yes Different Similar Different Different Different Different Different
Similarities 3 4 2 2 2 1 2
a ID Card (“Personalausweis“) or Passport
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carried out. For this purpose a “most different approach” has been adopted. Estonia
and Finland have been chosen from the first basic population listed above because
they show a high degree of involvement of the private sector in operating a national
eIDMS. Sweden and Denmark have been added, which although similar with regard
to the legal IDMS (i.e. obligation to register, unique personal identifier), so far have
not succeeded in introducing a planned eID card. The United Kingdom has not been
included in this second phase, because it differs with regard to all relevant variables
by not having a national ID and no obligation to register. Therefore introducing an
eID in this country is not an innovation of or within a national IDMS or a transition
from one national IDMS to new electronic one but a radical change of citizenship,
where the issue of online authentication only plays a very minor role (see Bennett
and Lyon 2008).
Overview and outlook
The following four papers by Mariën and Van Audenhove (2010), Aichholzer and
Strauß (2010), Heichlinger and Gallego (2010) as well as Noack and Kubicek (2010)
will present the four case studies of this first part of the comparative research. They
will start with the historic context of citizens´ registration and identification and on
this background describe the new eIDMS which is being introduced in terms of the
eID itself (i.e. attributes = data), the token(s) (in most cases eID cards), the process of
applying for an eID as well as the distribution and personalization. The actors
constellation will be mapped and the policy field taking the lead in the innovation
process, as well as the stages, main events and eventual controversial issues within this
process and competing eID systems, The legal framework including privacy
regulations will be referred to and finally the diffusion of new cards and the use of
their online authentication function will be assessed.
In these four cases the reader will encounter big differences on almost all
components. In a first comparative analysis we will depict the differences in the four
eIDMS, examine how these can be explained by the conceptual framework presented
here, and derive a set of generalizations across the four cases (Kubicek and Noack
2010a). As we cannot be sure that the four cases cover the whole range of eIDMS
being introduced in the European Community these days, four other cases studies
will follow, which are not based on personal interviews but on documents and which
will explicitly refer to some of the generalisations proposed (Hoff and Hoff 2010,
Rissanen 2010, Grönlund 2010, Martens 2010). Finally there will be a review on
how the generalisations presented before cover these cases as well and to what
extent the conceptual framework employed has proven to be useful or in which
respect further development seems necessary (Kubicek and Noack 2010b).
Regarding the potential of the integration of institutional analysis and path
analysis, there will be no completely satisfactory explanation of every difference
reported. When the existing older IDMS is considered as an important influencing
factor one would like to know more about its origin. As for example the obligation
to register and to hold an ID document in some countries dates back into the 16th or
17th century this would require historical analyses, which could not be conducted
within this cooperative project. Nor can we explain why some countries have a
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unique personal identity number for each citizen while others have banned such a
regulation. Despite questions for further research arising from this analysis strong
evidence emerges, that there is little room for technological determinisms. Not only
have different technological paths been chosen to develop a national eIDM, but more
important, for similar technical systems quite different organisational and regulatory
patterns have been established. This is not only of relevance for academic disputes
within technology related social science debates corroborating the social shaping
school. It also undermines all those comments in academia and the media, predicting
or expecting fundamental changes in the citizens-government relation, such as an
increase in surveillance.
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